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that case from the one at bar. In the Shaw case there was an executed
contract, while in the present case it was wholly executory. Furthermore
the suit in that case was instituted by a mortgagor, attempting to assert
a right of redemption after its release pursuant to the terms of the con-
tract, whereas here the mortgagor was endeavoring to extinguish the
mortgage indebtedness by his parol contract so as to deprive the mort-
gagee of his status as a creditor of the estate entitled to letters of ad-
ministration. The effect in the latter case is to force into the mortgagee
an interest in lands.
The Ohio Supreme Court has expressly recognized the distinction
between an executed and executory contract in question involving the
statute of frauds. Although the former has been held enforceable, the
latter has been expressly declared unenforceable as being within the
statute. Bumiller v. Walker, 95 Ohio St. 344, 1i6 N.E. 797, L.R.A.
191 8B ( 1917). Therefore, authority does not sustain an estoppel based
solely on an executory parol contract where neither party has substan-
tially relied, and since application of the concept of locus of title has been
subordinated to the view that the equity of redemption is an interest in
land which cannot be transferred without a writing, it would seem that
the appellate court erred in permitting the morgage debt to be extin-
guished. The practical effect of the decision is to allow a transfer of an
interest in land in contravention of the statute.
ROBIN W. LETT.
NEGLIGENCE
LIABILITY OF INSURANCE COMPANY WHEN DRIVER OF CAR Is
FOUND GUILTY OF WILFUL MISCONDUCT
Louis Brinsky, a passenger in a truck owned and operated by Meyer
and Silekovitz, was injured in a collision with a truck owned by the
Fro-Joy Baker-Tabor Ice Cream Company. The Common Pleas Court
of Lake County found Meyer and Silekovitz guilty of wilful and wanton
conduct, thereby taking the case out of the operation of the Guest Act
(Ohio Gen. Code 6308-6) and allowed recovery. Brinsky then filed a
supplemental petition against the defendant, the American Casualty
Company, alleging that Meyer and Silekovitz carried a liability policy
which obligated the defendant to pay the judgment. The policy con-
tained a clause relieving assured from "liability imposed by law upon the
assured, for damages on account of bodily injuries, including death re-
sulting therefrom, accidentally suffered or alleged to have been suffered
by any person. . . ." Held, Defendant insurance company is not liable
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since judgment against the assured was not one for injuries accidentally
suffered. American Casualty Company v. Brinsky, et al., 51 Ohio App.
298, 2 Ohio Op. 146, 200 N.E. 654 (934).
The distinction between negligence and wilful and wanton mis-
conduct has been clearly established in Ohio. A wilful act is one in
which the party acting intends to bring about a certain result. A negli-
gent act is one in which the party acting fails to come up to a required
standard of care. A wanton act, on the other hand, is one in which the
actor proceeds in a certain course of action knowing of the danger that
his conduct is likely to entail to others. Reserve Trucking Company v.
Fairchild, 128 Ohio St. 519, 191 N.E. 745 (1934); Universal Con-
crete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 5 Ohio Op. 214 (1936);
2 Ohio St. L.J. 315.
The Ohio Guest Statute has relieved the driver of a car (and, inci-
dentally, his insurance company) of all liability for injuries to a guest
except those sustained as a result of the wilful or wanton misconduct of
the driver (Ohio Gen. Code 6308-6).
A fortiori, the principal case, by refusing to allow injuries received
as a result of wilful or wanton misconduct to come under the provision
of a liability policy, has completely relieved the insurance company of
liability for injuries received by a guest of a policy holder.
It should be noted, however, that the principal case is noncommittal
on the question of whether or not injuries caused by the wanton mis-
conduct of a driver would be accidentally suffered. The jury declared
the driver guilty of wilful and wanton conduct so the appellate court
discussed the problems as if the driver had been guilty of wilful conduct
alone. Thus, it is possible that the decision of the principal case might
be avoided if a jury should declare a car owner guilty of only wanton
conduct. The later case of The Universal Pipe Co. v. Bassett, supra,
will indubitably facilitate this result since the sharp distinction that it
draws between wilful misconduct and wanton misconduct shows clearly
that a finding joining the tvo concepts would be inconsistent. So here it
might be considered that the finding of wilful and wanton misconduct
was inconsistent in that the jury, in effect, found that, first, the defend-
ant did the act deliberately, and, second, that he acted recklessly without
caring what the result might be.
Aside from this, however, the instant case is still open to consider-
able criticism. The verdict of the jury declared the driver guilty of wilful
conduct. The appellate court considered this to mean that the driver
acted with an intent to bring about a certain result-that he deliberately
collided with the truck in front of him. The question arises-is that
the real meaning of the word "wilful" as it is used in the legal sense?
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Perhaps, in theory "wilful" necessarily implies intent but in case law
examples of strict adherence to the theoretical meaning have been rare.
More often in a case such as this, "wilful" is held to be the deliberate
driving of the car in a certain way. In the case of Loveless v. Kirk, 34
Ohio L.Rep. 175 (App.) (930), mere failure of a driver of a car to
use ordinary care after observing plaintiff, a pedestrian, in the street
ahead was styled a "wilful conscious wrong" and the contributory neg-
ligence of the plaintiff was no defense to the suit. In Cleveland, C. C.
and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Starks, 58 Ind. App. 341, io6 N.E. 646 (i9i4),
the complaint was held to charge a wilful injury when defendant's train
failed to stop or give warning signals after the defendant became aware
of decedent's buggy on the track ahead. In the instant case it seems
absurd to say that the driver of the car had the actual intent to collide
with the truck owned by the ice cream company, especially, as such
collision would quite probably cause injury to himself.
For the purposes of discussion let us concede that the driver had
such an intent. Does it necessarily follow that the intent was directed
against the passenger, as the court assumes? Does it follow that there
was a specific intent to injure the guest? This seems even less plausible.
In a large number of cases in which the conduct of a person has been
characterized wilful, the act which was the cause of the damage was
deliberate but the resulting consequences were not intended or expected.
In Lobdell Car Wheel Co. v. Subielski, 2 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 462,
125 Ad. 462 (1924), it was held to be such a wilful act as to prevent
recovery under the compensation act of Delaware when the employee
removed his goggles after being ordered to wear them at all times. In
that case-the claimant did not intend or expect that his eyes should be
damaged by flying steel. So here it is difficult to believe that the driver
had an actual intent to injure his guest.
Again for the purposes of discussion let us assume the improbable,
that-the car owner deliberately collided with the truck ahead with the
intent to injure the passenger riding with him. Even under this assump-
tion the decision of the court is questionable as it is based upon a case that
is clearly not in point. The instant case was based wholly upon Com-
monwealth Casualty Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E. 278
(1928). There the driver of a taxi-cab committed a battery on a pas-
senger. The court held that the insurance company was not liable to the
taxi-cab company for the costs of defending the suit because the injuries
were the result of a personal assault, and not an accident. Surely there
dannot be derived from this case the proposition of law that an intentional
injury cannot be an accident as the word is used in an insurance policy.
There seems to be no other Ohio cases except Commonwealth Cas-
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ualty Co. v. Headers, supra, in which this question has been considered.
It is settled law in other jurisdictions, however, that, in the absence of
any policy provision on the subject, an injury inflicted upon the insured
by a third person, designedly and intentionally so far as the actor is
concerned, is an accident as to him and authorizes a recovery under an
accident policy, Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Wyness, 107 Ga. 584 (3), 589,
34 S.E. 113 (1899); American Accident Co. v. Carson, 99 Ky. 441,
36 S.W. x69, 34 L.R.A. 301, 59 Am. St. Rep. 473 (1896); New-
sonw v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 143 Ga. 785, 85 S.E.
1035 (1915); General fccident, Fire and Life Assur. Corporation v.
Hymes, 77 Okla. 2o, i85 Pac. IO85 (I919); 14 R.C.L. I26O; 22
Ohio Jur. 661.
This concept must be distinguished from a situation in which the
injury has been the result of the intentional act of the person claiming
under the accident policy. In that situation it is settled law that the
injury is not the result of an accident. New A9msterdam Casualty Co.
v. Johnson, 91 Ohio St. i55, L.R.A. 19i6B iox8, iio N.E. 475
(1914).
It should also be noted that if the injury intentionally inflicted by a
third party has been the result of some act of provocation on the part of
the insured he is precluded from recovery under an accident policy.
Hutton v. States Accident Ins. Co., 267 Ill. 267, io8 N.E. 296, L.R.A.
19 15E (1915); Prudential Casualty Co. v. Curry, io Ala. App. 642,
65 So. 852 (1914).
In view of the body of law contrary to the principal case and the
rather dubious basis on which it was predicated, it is difficult to believe
that the instant case represents the settled law of Ohio on this important
point. It would seem more likely that if the question should be carried
to the court of last resort, it would be decided in conformity with the
settled law of other states, viz., that an accident insurance policy covers
a situation in which the insured is injured as a result of the intentional
act of a third party. From this it would follow that an insurance com-
pany would be held liable under a liability policy for injuries to a guest
occasioned by the wilful or wanton misconduct of the driver.
GEORGE BAILEY.
LIABILITY OF .AN EMPLOYER FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF AN
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
Defendant corporation owned a clothing store in front of which,
and overhanging the sidewalk, was an electric sign. The defendant
contracted with the Power Co. to keep the sign in repair. The obliga-
